PlanetMysql.ru — информация о СУБД MySQL

For the DIY folks out there!

You're installing MySQL using the Generic Linux Binary tar ball? If you do, you'll need to create a system user and group using useradd and groupadd. However, you would like to use the standard system IDs. No problem, Red Hat defines their standard system users and groups in their manual respectively as 27 and 27.

Here are the commands to create the system user mysql and its group mysql:

 shell> groupadd -r -g 27 mysql
 shell> useradd -u 27 -g 27 -r -d /var/lib/mysql -s /bin/bash mysql

Topics for this podcast:

*EC pauses Oracle-Sun over MySQL
* Open source licenses debated
* Red Hat growth opportunities and Summit roundup
* Reductive Labs seeking cloud role for Puppet software
* VMware-SpringSource analyzed

iTunes or direct download (26:04, 5.9 MB)

Jay has already provided a good overview of the debate related to the apparent decline in the usage of the GPLv2. I don’t intend to cover the same ground, but I did want to quickly respond to a statement made by Matt Asay in his assessment of the reasons for and implications of reduced GPLv2 usage.

He wrote:

“as Open Core becomes the default business model for ‘pure-play’ open-source companies, we will see more software licensed under the Apache license”

I don’t doubt that we will see more software licensed under the Apache license, and also more vendors making use of permissively-licensed code, but I don’t see a correlation with the Open-Core model.

In our report, “Open Source is Not a Business Model“, report we found that 23.7% of the 114 vendors we covered were using Open-Core as a vendor licensing strategy. Looking at the stats, over 70% of Open-Core strategy users also used a variant of the GPL or LGPL.

The main reason for the correlation of the L/GPL and Open-Core is, as Matt notes, that “the GPL makes sense in a world where vendors hope to exercise control over their communities”. Carlo Daffara agrees: “the GPL is not a barrier in adopting this new style of open core model, and certainly creates a barrier for potential freeriding by competitors”.

Carlo cites as an example the use of the GPL by the usually Apache-focused SpringSource for its SpringSource dm Server as a means of restricting the commercial opportunities for potential rivals, something that we covered here.

As Matt explains, however, “if the desire is to foster unfettered growth, Apache licensing offers a better path”. Savio Rodrigues offers an example of a usually L/GPL-focused company - Red Hat/JBoss - choosing the Apache License for its new HornetQ messaging software because “the project team felt that the Apache license would ensure that the project’s code could be more easily included into products from the ecosystem.”

1-1 then. But this isn’t about point scoring. What the examples demonstrate is that vendors choose licenses for individual projects/products based on pragmatic business reasons rather than dogmatic commitment to licensing philosophy, and that - as we previously suggested - there is actually some benefit in the proliferation of different licenses.

Of course it is also important to remember that many vendors don’t have the luxury or choosing a license for the project they attempt to commercialize. Mike Olson notes that adoption has been a factor related to the Apache licensed Hadoop project - but what came first commercialization or adoption?

I believe we are seeing increased adoption of permissively-licensed open source software by both new open source specialists, such as Mike’s Cloudera, and also proprietary vendors such as Oracle, SAP and - as recently discussed - Day Software.

In these cases, the commercial vendor doesn’t choose the Apache license for software to encourage widespread adoption, it is encouraged to choose Apache-licensed software because of widespread adoption (not to mention the low cost and high quality advantages of being part of a true developer *community*).

That has more to do with the patron model, as discussed by Day Software’s chief marketing officer, Kevin Cochrane, than it does Open-Core.

Additionally, as Carlo notes, it is a product of the shift towards what he calls “consortia-managed projects”. Or as I previously stated: “if Open-Core was a significant revenue strategy of open source 3.0 (vendor-dominated open source projects such as MySQL, JasperSoft), then Embedded [as I was referring to the patron model at the time] is one of the commercial open source strategies of open source 4.0 (vendor-dominated open source communities such as Eclipse, Symbian).”

So while we expect Open-Core to remain a significant business model for ‘pure-play’ open-source companies, and we expect to see more software licensed under the Apache license, we don’t see the two as being directly related.

Anyway, this was supposed to be a quick post. That’s enough for now.

We reported recently on Red Hat’s revenue growth and deferred revenue. One of the things I have been looking at recently is the slowdown in Red Hat’s growth in recent years, and the opportunities that the company has to improve that growth.

For some perspective it is worth noting that while Red Hat’s revenue has been growing steadily:

The rate of growth has been in decline for some time:

We have also noted (451 Group clients only) that the company will in all likelihood have to invest in inorganic growth if it is to meet its ambitious targets (such as 50% of server operating system market share by 2015, and growing to $1bn in revenue over three years - from February 2008).

Unfortunately for Red Hat its opportunities for inorganic growth in its core Linux market are limited since its dominance of the enterprise Linux market means that very few vendors would help it gain serious Linux market share. While there are multiple opportunities for the company to expand into new markets one problem that the company has is that would-be acquisition targets (MySQL, Hyperic) keep getting snapped up by its rivals.

(This isn’t a post about inorganic growth opportunities, but given our suggestion that open source can serve as an on-ramp to the cloud I would suggest that Red Hat could do a lot worse than look at Eucalyptus Systems as a long-term growth opportunity).

Fortunately for Red Hat the two major acquisitions that it has made in recent years (JBoss and Qumranet) both provide the company with opportunities to drive organic growth. Indeed, looking at the company’s business it is interesting to note quite how many opportunities for organic growth are at its disposal:

* JBoss - Red Hat’s middleware business continues to grow faster than the Linux business, albeit still not as a reportable segment of the company’s revenue. The company noted that 30% of its largest deals involved a middleware is fiscal 2009, there is still a lot of opportunity for greater cross-selling. The acquisition of systems integration and consulting firm Amentra was designed to help it deliver better value to JBoss customers. That and the JBoss MASS migration tools should start to deliver.

* The channel - 61% of deals came from the channel in Q1, up from 56% Q4. Red Hat more than doubled channel partners to 4,500 in 2009. Advanced Partners - VARs/SIs - grew from about 100 to about 350 in 09. Additionally the company has noted that while its renewal rates for its biggest accounts are close to 100% (”I think the only one that didn’t in the last couple of years was Oracle itself”, noted Jim Whitehurst in June) renewal rates from channel deals tend to be lower. It has put a program in place to rectify that.

* Increased penetration into existing accounts - Red Hat had 40,000 new customers in FY09. As the Eclipse Foundation’s Donald Smith noted, that means the company has a low revenue per customer. However, it also suggests huge opportunity for increased penetration into existing customers.

* Up-selling to Advanced Platform - traditionally, 70% of Red Hat’s Linux users have been on what was Red Hat Enterprise Linux ES. However, 50% of renewals in FY09 upgraded to the higher price Advanced Platform, rather than going for the standard Enterprise Linux Server.

* Virtualization - One of the drivers for AP is that it includes the advanced virtualization capabilities. Interest in virtualization is not only generating demand for the higher-priced RHEL variant but also helps Red Hat to avoid spending freezes on new hardware by de-coupling RHEL adoption from new hardware spending.

* Free to fee - Matt Asay noted recently that “nonpaid usage of Red Hat’s software that may well pose a bigger risk” to Red Hat than its chief rival Novell. That is something that the company is aware of, and it has been auditing customers to ensure that the amount of RHEL systems they have running is suitable for their subscription level. The company also sees a significant opportunity in converting users of community Linux distributions - such as CentOS or Ubuntu - to RHEL subscribers, and in 4Q09 landed a multi-year, multi-million dollar free-to-paid deal.

Will those be enough to help the company achieve its ambitious goals? Possibly not, and we do believe that Red Hat needs to expand its addressable market, but it is clear that even without acquisitions Red Hat has multiple opportunities for growing revenue in the next couple of years.

Red Hat is celebrating the 10 year anniversary of its initial public offering. An anniversary to be proud of for Red Hat, but one that has given The VAR Guy pause for thought about the relative success of open source in the past 10 years.

“Would anyone have predicted that no additional open source companies would launch IPOs over the next decade? Ten years without an open source IPO … amazing and somewhat depressing for open source business advocates,” writes the VAR Guy.

It is somewhat depressing that there are not more public open source vendors. However, the statement that there have been no open source IPOs is simply not true. In fact there have been six open source IPOs since Red Hat.

These are covered in detail in our recent CAOS report, Open to Investment, but the edited version is as follows:

VA Linux/VA Software/SourceForge (Nasdaq:LNUX)
The next open source vendor to go public after Red Hat was VA Linux, which was then offering Intel-based servers designed to run Linux. VA Linux became VA Software in December 2001, having moved away from system hardware, and focused its attention on the SourceForge.net development repository and the SourceForge Enterprise development product, as well as media services such as Slashdot, Linux.com and Freshmeat. In 2007, VA Software sold its SourceForge Enterprise Edition software product to CollabNet and changed its name to SourceForge Inc.

Caldera/SCO Group (in Chapter 7)
The last open source vendor to go public before the dot-com bust was Linux distributor Caldera. The company acquired the Unix assets of Santa Cruz Operation in 2000 and changed its name to The SCO Group in 2002. The less said about it after that the better, probably.

Turbolinux (OSE :3777)
Having canceled its IPO in late 2001, Turbolinux eventually found its way to the stock market in September 2005 via an IPO on the Japanese Osaka Securities Exchange. Between those events, the Japanese Linux distributor was owned by Software Research Associates and then Livedoor. Turbolinux’s shares continue to be traded on the Osaka Securities Exchange.

Mandrakesoft/Mandriva (Euronext: FR0004159382)
French Linux distributor Mandrakesoft, which listed its shares on the Euronext Marche Libre in July 2001. Mandrakesoft acquired Brazilian Linux distributor Conectiva in February 2005 and changed its name to Mandriva before purchasing desktop Linux specialist Lycoris in July of the same year

Trolltech (acquired)
Linux application tools vendor Trolltech made its name with its Qt application development platform and Qtopia mobile device platform. The company made its debut on the Norwegian Oslo Bors in July 2006. In January 2008, it was acquired by Nokia for $153m and renamed Qt Software.

Sourcefire (Nasdaq:FIRE)
Sourcefire, which makes internal security products and sponsors the open source Snort intrusion detection engine, made its debut on the Nasdaq in March 2007, pricing its offering at $15 a share, giving it an opening market capitalization of $350m.

There have admittedly been just a handful of IPOs involving open source vendors. The lack of IPOs is due in part to the relative immaturity of commercial open source business strategies, the attractiveness of open source vendors as acquisition targets (MySQL was on the brink of an IPO when it was acquired) and the fact that the trajectory of these vendors has been impacted by two global economic crises (the dot com bust put pay to the IPOs of Linuxcare and Turbolinux, while there are a couple of vendors that might have been in a position to go public this year or next were it not for the current malaise.

Our CAOS report includes a list of the vendors we think are best positioned for a run at an IPO in the 12-24 months after the downturn ends.